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Abstract 
 
This paper describes the examination of emerging 
institutions and phase transition of service ecosystems 
in value cocreation processes under the basic tenets of 
service-dominant logic. We conducted several 
computational experiments with an agent-based model, 
in which we represented the generic actors and their 
operant resources, and examined their interactive 
behaviors in agent-based simulations. In the 
simulations, actors started changing their social 
properties from self-supporting individuals to 
reciprocal resource integraters. During the transaction, 
the actors increasingly specialized into specific roles 
and clusters of actors with the identical roles emerged 
– pointing towards processes of institutionalization, 
and dependent on the conditions of land fertility levels. 
Several phase transitions were observed in emerging 
service ecosystems, which were supported by complex 
structures of exchange and collaboration networks. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Service-dominant (S-D) logic has been proposed as 
a theoretical foundation for understanding economic 
exchange and value cocreation among actors from a 
service-for-service perspective. In S-D logic, service 
represents a transcending concept to goods and 
services, highlighting that economic exchange is 
primarily about the activities that actors do for others 
and want done for themselves [11][14][15][16]. This 
view is relatively orthogonal to the traditional approach, 
in which exchange and value creation are understood 
in terms of goods – tangible firm output embedded 
with value [15]. Consistent with others [14] we refer to 
such goods-centered thinking as goods-dominant (G-
D) logic. S-D logic views all actors as generic [17] – 
that is, it disregards the producer-consumer divide, 
since all market participants mutually engage in 
service-providing and resource-integrating activities, 
central to value cocreation. More generally, S-D logic 
holds that the assignment of predefined roles to market 
actors unduly restricts our understanding of the 
mutually interdependent activities of actors from which 
roles and other institutional structures emerge. S-D 
logic seeks to understand markets and, at a higher level, 
whole economies, as a result of these mutual exchange 
activities and institutional structures that make up 
service-ecosystems -- relatively self-contained, self-
adjusting systems of resource-integrating actors 
connected by shared institutional arrangements and 
mutual value creation through service exchange [19]. 
Arguably, this simplified view allows a clearer vision 
and understanding of the systemic nature of value 
creation, by examining the emergence of macro-level 
phenomena. Emergence is often broadly defined as a 
property of a system that is not present in its micro-
level parts, but that arises from their interaction 
(usually associated with serendipity, unexpected 
consequences, etc.). These emerging phenomena are 
also thought to form a “subset of the vast (and still 
expanding) universe of cooperative interactions that 
produce synergistic effects of various kinds” [3].  
The purpose of this research is to initiate the 
examination of emerging institutions and service 
ecosystems in value cocreation processes under the 
basic tenets of S-D logic [5][6]. In this paper, we 
conduct several computational experiments, in which 
we represent the generic actors and their operant 
resources in an agent-based model, and examine their 
interactive behaviors in agent-based simulations. The 
agents do not have explicit, predefined roles at the 
beginning, such as fishermen, farmers, and marketers, 
but instead get identified with such roles and specific 
locations in their environment over time as a result of 
dynamic environmental conditions and evolving skills 
(influenced by opportunities and experiences) brought 
about by engaging in service-for-service exchange. The 
agents gradually form a cooperative society that is 
consistent with important features of S-D logic’s 
service ecosystem.  
 
2. Related Work  
 
2.1. S-D Logic 
 
Vargo and Lusch first introduced S-D logic in a 
paper in 2004 [14], in which they proposed an inverted 
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interpretation of economic activities traditionally 
explained from a goods-dominant and firm-centric 
viewpoint [10][16][19]. The basic concepts in S-D 
logic are interdependent; that is they are related to each 
other through recursive processes of value cocreation, 
as shown in Fig.1 [20]. Actors are fundamentally not 
different from each other, but vary in their levels of 
operant resources (e.g., skills and abilities). Service 
consists of the application of multiple resources 
(obtained from private, public and market sources) and 
are gathered and integrated by actors. Actors exchange 
service to satisfy their own requirements for living by 
helping others (thus increasing the viability of the 
system). 
For service exchange to occur, actors depend on 
rules, called institutions. Some of these institutions are 
formalized (e.g. laws) and thus appear to be externally 
given, while others exist informally and endogenously 
emerge. All of them are, however selectively applied. 
These service activities, over time, stabilize value 
cocreating practices, resulting in discernible patterns. 
All emerge from actors’ activities. In S-D logic, an 
interdependent structure among actors is called a 
service ecosystem, conceptualized in terms of 
reciprocally service-providing actors, coordinated by 
institutions. Value cocreation processes are recursive 
and change institutions and ecosystems dynamically. 
Such dynamism is embedded in value cocreation and 
service ecosystems -- relatively self-contained, self-
adjusting systems of resource-integrating actors 
connected by shared institutional arrangements and 
mutual value creation through service exchange [18]. 
 
2.2. Emergence and entropy 
 
There are various meanings and definitions of 
emergence in the scientific literatures. With respect to 
the question of causal discontinuity and whether or not 
emergence is compatible with reductionism, the terms 
weak and strong emergence have been applied [4]. 
Strong meanings of emergence generally denote the 
idea of causal discontinuity (from physical laws), and 
thus properties observed at the macro level, are 
intrinsically irreducible to and consequently 
unpredictable from (e.g., physical) properties at the 
micro level. Weak emergentists argue that emergent 
transitions are superficial at best. There are no new 
causal laws and the radical reorganization of parts are 
only due to their complex interactions. For example, 
Bedau discussed micro and macro level properties 
observed in emergence and provided a concept of weak 
emergence; “Weak emergence refers to the aggregate 
global behavior of certain systems. The system's global 
behavior derives just from the operation of micro level 
processes, but the micro-level interactions are 
interwoven in such a complicated network that the 
global behavior has no simple explanation” [1][2]. In 
emergence, the aggregation of micro level behavior 
generates discernible patterns of macro level 
phenomena. Stated differently, disorderedness at the 
micro level transpires into order observed at the macro 
level.  
The identification of emergence is central to this 
paper, therefore we need a measure expressing how 
strongly emergence occurs. Entropy is a metric to 
represent disorder in a complex dynamic system 
[12][13]. There are several types of entropies proposed 
in various domains such as thermodynamic entropy, 
Boltzmann’s entropy, social entropy, information 
entropy, generalized entropy, and so on. For example, 
in information entropy,  indicates the number of an 
attribute’s values that agents possibly have, and  
indicates the statistical probability of agents owning 
the -th value of an attribute. We refer to the entropy  
in Eq. (1). 
 
 
(1) 
 
Emergence  can be defined as the decrease of 
entropy  from the beginning of some process to the 
end: 
 
 (2) 
 
Gershenson defined a self-organization measure 
similar to Eq. (2) [7]. 
It is important that emergence restricts disordered 
states and reduces some kinds of entropies of the states. 
For example, actors are located so randomly at the 
beginning in a simulation where entropy is high, 
because the states are disordered. After several periods, 
actors limit their locations to small areas, and start 
generating groups with the same properties. At this 
stage, entropy decreases, because the actors' states 
become ordered and emerging patterns of actors arise 
   
Figure 1.  Core processes of service dominant 
logic. 
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in the simulation. As a result, the emergence of 
homogeneous groups (with respect to their roles) 
reduces entropy. 
 
3. Agent based simulation 
 
3.1. Scenario 
 
In order to examine the explanatory power of S-D 
logic for emerging institutions and ecosystems in value 
cocreation, we keep the background scenario very 
simple as follows; 
 
Actors reside on the land. In order to survive, they 
need certain amounts of both protein and 
carbohydrate. To obtain them, they need to catch 
fish and grow wheat, and sometimes cooperate with 
each other. 
 
In this scenario, the value denotes to stay alive each 
period. In order to create value, each actor holds two 
basic types of skills, such as catching-fish and 
growing-wheat, which are represented as operant 
resources in S-D logic. Additionally, actors can 
exchange their resources and collaborate with each 
other and thus cocreate value. These interacting and 
integrating activities also require other types of operant 
resources, such as collaborating and exchanging skills. 
Collaboration is a skill to promote resource integration, 
while the skill to exchange promotes outcome resource 
integration.  
 
3.2. Agent modeling 
 
3.2.1. Base model. We modeled properties of an agent 
according to S-D logic as follows [6]: 
 
 Actor:  
 An actor is an autonomous agent in the 
simulation. 
 Operand Resource: 
 Fish is a resource that provides protein. 
 Wheat is a resource that provides carbohydrates. 
 Land is a locational resource. 
 Operant Resource: 
 Catching fish is a skill of an actor. 
 Growing wheat is a skill of an actor. 
 Exchanging is a skill of an actor. 
 Collaborating is a skill of an actor. 
 Fertilizing is the fertility level of land. 
 
3.2.2. Skill and effort. Throughout the simulations, no 
particular role, such as fisherman or farmer, is formally 
assigned to an actor. We use the terms fisherman and 
farmer only to denote their relative levels of 
capabilities but not to impose in what activities they 
“should” engage. Initially, we only (randomly) assign 
capability levels and locations to actors. More 
specifically, a capability consists of two parts, i.e. skill 
and effort. The skill is an absolute level for doing a 
task. Each actor has a different skill level that allows it 
to achieve different performances in a task. As a result, 
it obtains different resultant outcomes corresponding to 
its skill level. The effort is a relative value that splits an 
actor’s workload (at each iteration or period) into how 
much time it invests in obtaining one or the other 
resource (thus the ratio of the use of his operant 
resources). The total amount of effort for using the 
operant resources that an actor holds is summed to 1. 
Following this restriction for the total effort, each 
effort value (for fishing, farming and exchanging) is 
initially assigned with a uniform distribution between 0 
and 1, whereas the total amount of effort is 
canonicalized to 1.0. A particular capability (e.g. 
growing wheat) is calculated by multiplying an actor’s 
skill value (e.g. to grow wheat) by the effort value to 
obtain the same resource. 
 
3.2.3. Inheritance. All activities in the simulation are 
controlled by period and devolved through generations. 
In every period, an actor must ingest certain amounts 
of protein and carbohydrate to survive; otherwise it 
dies. Each actor also has a lifespan and at the end of 
the lifespan it dies. An actor periodically generates a 
child actor, whose properties are inherited from the 
parent actor with some fluctuations. 
When inheriting the capability value, which 
consists of effort and skill values, and location from a 
parent, inherited values involve the following Gaussian 
noise in the later experiments: 
 
 An effort value of a child actor  follows the 
normal distribution . 
 A skill value of a child actor  follows the 
normal distribution . 
 A location of a child actor  follows the 
normal distribution . 
 
The sum of effort values for the operant resources is 
canonicalized to 1.0 afterwards. The inheritance rules 
assign values to actors once, and then these values are 
unchanged through the actor’s lifespan.  
In each period, actors expend effort to obtain 
protein and carbohydrate to survive. Over time the map 
of the world gradually changes, partly due to actor 
deaths and births and partly because only good 
properties and locations are inherited by descendants. 
Individual actors' locations are not changed through the 
Page 1928
  
actors' lifespans; child actors reside close to the 
locations of their well-performing parent with the 
Gaussian distribution noise. Then, natural selection 
leads to a change in population distribution; it is an 
evolutionary mechanism. 
 
3.2.4. Exchange. If an actor has capabilities high 
enough to obtain a necessary amount of fish and wheat, 
it can survive by itself, but if it does not have one or 
the other part, it has to find another actor for resource 
exchange. 
 
 When an actor has a surplus amount of fish but has 
an insufficient amount of wheat, it needs to find an 
actor who has a surplus amount of wheat but has an 
insufficient amount of fish and exchange its 
outcomes to satisfy its respective conditions for 
survival. 
 When an actor neither has sufficient amounts of 
fish nor wheat, it needs to play a role of a marketer, 
that is, a mediator to help other actors to exchange 
their resources. The marketer earns a part of the 
exchanging resources as a reward for mediation and 
cumulates amounts of resources to satisfy its 
condition for surviving. 
 
The exchange skill is also an operant resource, 
measured as a capability. If an actor has a higher 
exchange capability, the actor can visit more actors 
who live far from the actor, and get larger amounts of 
rewards. 
 
3.2.5. Collaboration. The process of catching fish 
holds several sub-tasks or sub-roles, such as preparing 
a fishing net, operating a fishing boat, finding schools 
of fish, and catching fish. Although an actor can do all 
these tasks by itself, it is sometimes inefficient. If 
several actors collaborate and share their tasks as a 
group, they can obtain outcomes more efficiently than 
the sum of stand-alone activities by themselves. Such 
activities require a collaboration skill among members 
of the group. 
In order to explain the collaboration skill, we, at 
first, start representing a base level of an actor's 
operant resource for catching fish or growing wheat in 
the actor's effort  and skill , where  is an index of 
actor and  is a type of operant resources, such as fish 
or wheat. When a land fertility for type  at location 
 is represented as , then the actor's basic 
performance  is expressed in Eq.(3). 
 
 (3) 
 
 If this actor collaborates with an actor , its 
performance becomes larger than its original 
performance, but if the collaborator focuses on another 
type of work, such as fishing or farming, from the actor, 
the effect of collaboration gets smaller than that with 
the same-type collaborator. Additionally, an actor also 
has capability value for collaborating, denoted as , 
where  is an index of actor. In order to satisfy all 
constraints described here, we define the performance 
with collaboration by calculating the original 
performance multiplied by ). 
 
 (4) 
 
Moreover, if this actor collaborates with two actors 
 and , its performance should be multiplied by 
. Generally stated, 
the actor's performance is calculated as Eq.(5), when  
is the number of collaborators. 
 
 
(5) 
 
Final outcomes in a simulation period involves 
Gaussian noise, and are calculated in  multiplied by 
a fluctuation function given as Gaussian distribution. 
Locations of collaborators are limited to a small 
square around the focal actor. Fig.2 shows a sample 
map around an actor in a square whose width is limited 
to 5. The black square located at the center is location 
where the focal actor resides. A blue square indicates 
that an actor resides on it, and a white square indicates 
that no actor resides on it. As an example, two squares 
shown as red and yellow edges are selected as 
collaborators. There is an actor at yellow-edged square, 
but no actor at red-edged square, then collaboration is 
successfully done only with the actor on the yellow 
square. When the actor on the yellow square has 
, , , and , then 
the performance is multiplied by 
. 
Although an actor selects  collaborators within a 
diameter from its residential location, basically at 
random, the simulator optionally memorizes the 
partners collaborated with in the past. If the currently 
selected partner has worse performance than the 
partner in the past, and the memorizing option is set as 
      
Figure 2.  Collaboration partners 
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true, then the past partner is finally selected as a 
collaboration partner. Additionally, a memorized 
partner navigates to find better partners by introducing 
the partner's partners. This navigation makes 
collaboration networks larger than the original 
collaboration diameter. 
The more actors reside around the focal actor and 
hold the same operant resources, such as catching-fish 
or growing-wheat, the higher expected effect (gains) of 
the collaboration for the focal actor arises. If few actors 
reside around the focal actor or the actors' preferable 
operant resources are different from the focal actor, the 
expected effect of the collaboration becomes smaller. 
Therefore, the residential location and surrounding 
partners’ preferences are very important for 
collaboration. 
 
3.3. Land fertility 
 
A world map is given as a cell structure, and each 
cell involves zero or one actor. The shape of the world 
map is a torus, where the right edge is connected to the 
left edge, and the top edge is connected to the bottom 
edge. The map size is 200 x 200. An actor who obtains 
1.0 fish and 1.0 wheat in a period can survive on the 
land and generates a child actor every five periods. 
If the land is very fertile, actors can survive by 
themselves, and no resources are integrated among 
them. Since we would like to observe an evolutionary 
selection as a result of resource integration, the fertility 
level of the land is inevitably set at a poor level. If the 
fertility level is poor, most actors whose properties are 
randomly assigned immediately die due to lack in their 
outcomes. To avoid immediate death, we necessary set 
a fertile area at the center of the land where initial 
actors start living, and set a poor condition at the outer 
area. The radius of the area is 10 units, and the initial 
number of actors is set to 50. 
Fig.3 shows a sample of snapshots of the history of 
the simulation map, where each cell color is 
determined as the actor's efforts for the activities. 
Fishing, farming and exchanging efforts are expressed 
in brightness of blue, red and green. In the early stage, 
actors live together within the center circle, and then 
start expanding their residential areas outside the circle. 
During the expansion, actors transit toward fishermen 
(blue) or farmers (red). Residential areas are expanding 
in a large circle. In Fig.3(c), marketers (green) come 
out at the left hand side, and help other actors to 
exchange their outcomes. 
The map is not always explicitly divided into 
fishermen, farmers and marketers. It depends on the 
environments, such as fertility levels of the land. In 
Fig.4, different fertility levels expressed in 'f'. generate 
different distributions of roles. 'f = 2.0' is a fertility 
level where the actor obtains 2.0 outcome in a period 
without collaboration if an actor's skills for fishing and 
farming are both 1.0. If an actor obtains 2.0 fish, it can 
exchange 1.0 fish to 1.0 wheat, and stay alive. If a 
fertility level is less than 2.0, actors need to collaborate 
with other actors. In a case of f = 1.4 or 1.6 in Fig.4, 
areas of fishermen and farmers are clearly separated. It 
indicates that they need to strongly specialize and 
collaborate their tasks to work efficiently and then 
exchange their outcomes with the opposite typed actors. 
On the other hand, in the case of f = 2.0 or 3.0, most 
cells are filled with dark purple color that consists of a 
half blue and red. It indicates that the actors do not 
specialize their tasks and work for both fishing and 
farming by themselves. Because of the richness of the 
land, the actors keep their lives by themselves without 
specialization and exchange. 
 
3.4. Calculation model for entropy 
 
We propose two types of calculation models for 
entropy; spatial and relational entropies. First, we 
define an actor’s type as a type of operant resource, for 
which the actor spends most effort. Spatial entropy is 
based on randomness of adjacent neighbors' types. For 
the focal actor and eight-neighbor actors, it counts the 
number of actors for each type, calculates shares for 
each type, and then calculates entropy by Eq. (1). 
Relational entropy is based on partner relationships. It 
is similar to spatial entropy, but calculates it for the 
focal actor and its collaboration partners. The current 
     
(a) Initial stage (b) Middle stage  (c) Final stage  
Figure 3.  Sample of growing population 
     
(a) f=1.4             (b) f=1.6          (c) f=1.8 
 
 (d) f=2.0         (e) f=3.0  
Figure 4.  Different fertility levels 
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simulator deals with three actor types, such as 
fisherman, farmer and marketer. If the three types 
evenly exist in a group, the entropy is 1.58. If all actors 
are the same type, the entropy is 0. 
 
4. Institutions  
 
Actors in a society work with collaborators and 
exchange their resources with other actors. Such social 
actions are constrained with locally governed rules and 
customs; that is institutions. In the simulation, local 
groups, such as fishermen or farmer groups, emerged 
as a result of aggregating micro behaviors of actors. 
These emergent groups point towards endogenous 
institutions. For example, an actor living in the 
fishermen group should work better as a fisherman, 
because the actor has more chances to collaborate with 
neighbors. On the other hand, if the actor behaves as a 
farmer, the actor must work alone without help, thus 
the outcomes become smaller. The actor's specialty is 
not only dependent on its talent but also on its 
surrounding environments. The institutions are not 
guaranteed as optimum solutions, but reasonably fitting 
to the surrounding situations. 
In S-D logic, institutions are endogenously 
generated. There are two types of ways to generate 
institutions. 
 
 Micro to macro generation: Aggregation of actors’ 
micro behaviors spontaneously leads to a macro 
structure.  
 Macro to micro generation: Actors’ local 
recognition of surrounding environments enhances 
the macro structure of the institutions that constrain 
the actors' micro behaviors. 
 
In the preliminary experiments, we found that 
specialized groups emerged that aid survival. This is a 
sort of emergent pattern from micro behaviors. If an 
actor has cognitive ability to recognize that groups 
increase chances of survival, actors might seek out 
groups in order to survive. Although actors hardly 
capture whole phenomena from a truly macro 
viewpoint, they can capture local patterns, and change 
their behavior toward more conducive conditions for 
survival. Following the above idea, we define two 
macro to micro institutions and examine their effects. 
 
Rule 1: An actor counts up the number of neighbor 
actors (max. 8-neighbors). Then, the actor randomly 
selects a destination location in a limited distance, and 
counts up the number of neighbor actors in in the same 
way. If the destination has more actors surrounding, 
the focal actor moves to the destination. 
Rule 2: An actor categorizes 8-neighbors with their 
specialties, such as fishermen, farmers, and marketers. 
If more than half belong to the same category, the actor 
adapts its effort level to the majority. For example, if 
the actor finds five fishermen in 8-neighbors, it raises 
its fishing effort even if its farming skill is very high. 
 
In these rules, an actor does not directly recognize a 
group, but the actor tends to move toward a location 
where more actors reside, or to change its working 
effort to make its own resource integrating with 
neighbors’ resources smoothly. As a result, actors or 
descendants of the actors tend to aggregate together to 
keep their lives longer. 
Fig.5 shows results of applying the macro 
institutions to actors. The fertility level is set so high, 
such as 3.0, that the original model does not generate 
groups. However, when rule 2 is applied, shown in 
Fig.5(c), groups appear. If both rules 1 and 2 are 
applied, the boundary of groups becomes clearer, 
shown in Fig.5(d). 
 
5. Experiments and analysis 
 
5.1. Transitions in social structures  
 
5.1.1. Early stages. At the initial state, 50 actors are 
located in a small circle at the center of the map. 
Within the circle, the land is so fertile that actors can 
easily keep their lives as they obtain a sufficient 
amount of fish and wheat. They are relatively 
independent from others and rarely exchange their 
services. During some thousands periods, depending 
on the given conditions, actors remain in the circle, and 
are gradually changing their internal properties, such as 
skill levels and their collaboration partners, but it 
remains hard to migrate from the circle, because the 
land out of the circle is too severe to live. However, the 
circle is so small that its growth inevitably stops.  
     
(a) Original          (b) Rule1 
 
                 (c) Rule2      (d) Rules 1 & 2  
Figure 5.  Different fertility levels 
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5.1.2. Transition stages. Even in the early stages, 
quite a few pioneers try to migrate, but most of them 
immediately die because of lack of resources. This 
fragile situation is broken down suddenly, perhaps, by 
an incidental co-occurrence of actors who are 
specialized into the identical skill and try to go outside. 
Fig.6 is a snapshot where a group of actors specialized 
in fishing(blue) are pouring out from the small circle. 
They can survive because they are tightly coupled with 
each others in collaborative resource integrating links. 
Additionally, another group specialized in farming(red) 
simultaneously appear at the different side of the circle 
as service exchange partners. 
Such a phase transition process can be explained as 
dynamics of ecological systems described by 
Holling[9]. He proposed four phases in an adaptive 
cycle of ecosystems; phases of growth(r), 
conservation(K), release of bound-up resources( ), and 
reorganization( ). The observed stages in Fig.6 are in a 
transition from conservation(K) to release( ), and 
continue to a phase of reorganization( ). 
Fig.7 shows a sample case of this phase transition 
process. The X axis is a period divided by 10. 
Population started increasing after around 700 periods, 
shown as 70 in Fig.7. The population exponentially 
increased, and stopped at 20,000 that is the maximum 
number of the actors in a setting of a half of the map 
size, shown in Fig.7(a). The other graphs show changes 
of the actor's other properties. Fig.7(b) shows the 
change of average outcome levels of the actors who 
reside outside of the center circle. Before the phase 
transition, the average outcomes are less than 1.0, so 
that most of actors cannot survive, but at the transition 
point, the outcomes are drastically improved, and then 
converged on 1.0. This shift corresponds to phases 
from release( ) to reorganization( ). Similar tendency 
is also observed in skill levels, shown in Fig.7(c). The 
skill levels gradually increase in a conservation 
phase(K), and at the release phase( ), they reach the 
maximum skill of 1.0.  
 
5.1.3. Growing stages. Fig.7(d) provides a different 
viewpoint in terms of entropy and emergence. In 
Fig.7(d), entropy is the relational entropy calculated by 
counting types of collaboration partners. Before the 
phase transition, all actors resided in the circle and had 
various types of collaborators around them, but after 
the transition, their neighbors became almost identical 
so that the entropy converged into zero through the 
growth(r) and conservation(K) phases. Emergence is 
calculated by the differences of the spatial entropy 
between the observed state and the completely 
disordered state calculated in the theoretically-random 
model. Emergence levels increased during the 
conservation(K), because actors were specialized and 
aggregated into the same types. 
 
5.1.4. General behaviors. Fig.8 shows the general 
process of the phase transition. In these graphs, x-axes 
are canonicalized to the size of the population. Because 
the radius of the center circle is 10, the size of cells 
within the circle is around 314. Therefore, the 
transition are always observed at the stages from 300 to 
500 actors. In Fig.8, the number of actors and the 
indicators were plotted as results of ten simulations 
conducted. These graphs show similar tendencies 
observed in a sample process shown in Fig.7, such as 
raising outcomes and skill levels, and decreasing 
entropy levels. 
 
5.2. Micro to macro emergence of institutions 
 
Figure 6.  Snapshot of actors’ spouting out 
     
(a) Population               (b) Outcome 
 
             (c) Skill levels                  (d) Entropy 
Figure 7.  Sample of growing process 
     
(a) Outcome              (b) Skill levels 
 
 (c) Entropy 
Figure 8.  Canonicalized growing process 
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Institutional emergence is partially a  function  of  
environment, such as fertility of the land. This 
subsection examines in more depth the effect of 
fertility levels from 1.4 to 3.4 with 0.05 pitch. For each 
fertility level, we conducted 20 simulations; Totally 
800 simulations were conducted. We observed actors' 
properties when the number of actor reached 20,000. 
 
5.2.1. Growth rate and skills. Fig.9(a) shows the 
periods taken to reach the end. As fertility levels were 
raised, the periods became shorter because fertile lands 
provide environments suitable for increasing 
population. Fig.9(b) shows the skill levels obtained by 
the specialized actors. As the fertility levels were 
raised, the skill levels decreased. This is because fertile 
lands do not require higher skill levels for obtaining a 
sufficient amount of resources.  
 
5.2.2. Path dependencies. Fig.9(c) shows the 
population for each specialization. In this graph, 
fishermen and farmers are drawn in the same color: red, 
because these two specialized actors have no difference 
in observation. Green marks represent marketers, and 
purple marks express actors that are not specialized. It 
is remarkable that two separate modes come out in 
lower fertility levels. Purple marks are divided into 
almost 20,000 and the others. Red marks are also 
divided into 5,000-10,000 levels and almost zero, 
which is hard to see in the graph, because green marks 
are overdrawn. In other words, specialized actors are 
dominant and unspecialized actors are rare, in one 
mode, and specialized actors are rare and unspecialized 
actors are dominant, in another mode. These modes 
non-deterministically appeared by the random seeds. 
When the phase transition starts with two distinct 
specialized groups of actors, these specialized actors 
become dominant. When it starts with unspecialized 
actors, the unspecialized actors become dominant. 
These two modes are also observed in average 
outcome and emergence graphs shown in Fig.9(d) and 
(e). 
 
5.3. Macro to micro emergence of institutions 
 
As described in Section 4, local pattern recognition 
enables actors to generate institutions in manners of 
macro-to-micro effects. Fig.10(a) shows average 
outcomes and Fig.10(b) shows emergence. The 
original model is represented with black colored points, 
the rule 1 is with green, the rule 2 is with red, and the 
combination of rules 1 and 2 is with blue. The rule 2 
and the combination are marked at higher cluster in the 
graphs of Fig.10(a) and (b). This indicates that rule 2 
and the combination generate highly separate groups 
with specialization as an institution, and obtain higher 
outcomes. It suggests that local pattern recognition 
enables actors to generate stronger institutions. 
 
5.4. Large scale simulation 
 
It used 800 x 800 cell map. As an initial state, we 
set two fertile circles located close to the center. Fig.11 
shows the maps of middle and final stages after the 
long run. At the middle stage of the first conservation 
phase(K), specialized marketers came out at the edge 
of the living area as a result of necessity for many 
actors to rely on the marketers for their service 
exchange, because the market became larger. This led 
     
(a) Growing Periods            (b) Skill levels 
 
 (c) Population for types   (d) Average Outcome 
 
(e) Entropy 
Figure 9.  Canonicalized growing process 
     
(a) Outcome                (b) Entropy 
Figure 10.  Institutions by local recognition 
 
(a) Middle stage         (b) Final stage 
Figure 11.  Large scale simulation 
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to the second level reorganization phase( ) where the 
marketers dominate service exchange markets. The 
marketers gradually moved to the center of the map 
because the marketers must interact with many 
fishermen and farmers to exchange resources. This 
process corresponds the second conservation phase(K). 
There was another case with different parameters, 
where most actors suddenly died after the growth. The 
residential area shrunk to the original center circle and 
started growing again. It seemed that a balance of 
mutual dependencies among actors was partially 
collapsed at first, and it was spread over the whole, like 
the collapse of the bubble economy. 
 
6. Discussion  
 
6.1. Institutions and ecosystems in S-D logic 
 
This section discusses observed phenomena in the 
experiments along the concepts described in Fig.1. 
 
6.1.1. Actor and specialization. No special roles are 
assigned to any actor at the initial stage, but actors are 
gradually specializing by a process of evolutionary 
selection. The current simulator does not permit actors 
to change their efforts and skill levels for operant 
resources in their lifespan except in the case of local 
pattern recognition experiments, but an evolutionary 
selection mechanism selects specialized actors as 
survivors. 
 
6.1.2. Resource integration and service exchange. 
There are two types of resource integration, i.e. 
exchange and collaboration. In exchange, actors' 
outcomes are exchanged for complementing their 
obtained operand resources. In collaboration, actors' 
skills are specialized in a part of activities, and shared 
among collaborative actors. The outcomes and skills 
are also defined as operand and operant resources in S-
D logic, thus these exchanging and collaborative 
activities are both recognized as service exchange. 
 
6.1.3. Institutions. At the beginning, the simulation 
field is flat and no distinction exists on the field. While 
actors are selected via an evolutionary mechanism, 
special groups, such as fisherman and farmer groups, 
appear. In a fisherman group, an actor behaves better 
as fisherman, because there are more opportunities to 
obtain more outcome to stay alive. This is a sort of 
local institution. Institutions are dynamically 
configured through evolutionary process of the 
simulation, and dynamically changed in their 
environments. 
An institution is a macro-level observation 
generated from micro-level activities. On the other 
hand, if a macro-level institution from local viewpoint 
is recognized by the actors and a rule is applied for the 
actors to enhance the institution, micro-level behaviors 
of the actors might change. In the experiments, when 
the macro institutions which enforce actors to come 
close to each other was assigned or change their roles 
to adjust to the neighbors, groups were intensively 
generated. As shown in this result, micro behaviors and 
macro institutions are correlated with each other and 
configure social systems, called service ecosystems. 
 
6.1.4. Service ecosystems. We observed dynamics of 
service ecosystems in forms of phase transitions. As a 
background of the transitions, there are social networks 
where actors gather around strong actors and generate 
huge groups. Fig.12 consists of three drawings. The 
left hand is a population map, the center is a 
collaboration link map, and the right hand is an 
exchange link map. It shows that collaboration network 
inside the groups and exchange network between the 
groups are complicatedly mixed, and configure service 
ecosystems. 
Exchange and collaboration are both important to 
make the service ecosystems stable. Collaboration is a 
process integration of resources, and it corresponds to a 
structure of organizations in the real world. On the 
other hand, exchange is an outcome integration of 
resources, and the exchange network is relatively 
dynamic in terms of its configuration. Both are tightly 
coupled with each other, and keep their total structures 
stable. 
 
6.2. Emergence 
 
Helbing explains the emergence of cooperative or 
coordinating norms in a game theoretic situations with 
agent preferences [8]. His methodology is similar to 
our research, because the world is a grid, and agents 
work in time series of the world. However, agents are 
cognitive in a sense of determining their behaviors 
against their profits in his model. Additionally, his 
model does not have complex social networks, like 
exchanging and collaborating networks. 
Emergence has been formalized in many ways 
described in Section2.2. We followed the definition of 
weak emergence proposed by Bedau [1][2], and 
     
(a) population (b) Collaboration  (c) Exchange  
Figure 12.  Service ecosystems 
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defined the emergence in terms of entropy in Eq.(2), 
referring to Gershenson's work[7]. This formalization 
worked well in an S-D logic simulation especially for 
analyzing dynamism in service ecosystems and 
institutionalization. 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
This paper examined a quantitative explanation of 
S-D logic using agent based simulation. We modeled 
an actor as an agent, and defined operant resources in it. 
The operant resources were measured in skill and 
effort values. At the beginning, the skill and effort 
values were randomly assigned to actors, but they were 
gradually modified through evolutionary selection, and 
finally were specialized into specific roles. We also 
introduced two types of resource integration skills, 
such as exchange and collaboration, which contributed 
to create institutions and service ecosystems. Sample 
scenarios were very simple, but we succeeded to 
explain some parts of phenomena expected in S-D 
logic, such as emerging endogenous institutions and 
the formation of service ecosystems. The actors 
mutually interacted with each other and successfully 
cocreated value. The proposed models and scenarios 
were so simple that we should expand them in future 
and analyze in greater detail. 
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